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1. Introduction 
In 2010, China replaced Japan and became the second economic power 
house in the world. China also became the largest market, and its presence 
in the world became even more exceptional. Following government projects 
such as “Zou Chu Qu” (overseas expansion) and “The Belt and Road 
Initiative” (to build the Silk Road Economic Zone), a lot of Chinese 
companies advanced into the global market. At the same time, these 
Chinese companies will be potential rivals for developed countries’ 
multinational enterprises (DMNEs). Furthermore, the aggressive project 
“Made in China 2025”1) and China’s assertive behavior strengthened the 
“China threat theory” over the world. Many countries, America included, 
began to encircle and suppress China, the “trade war” and the battle for 
high-tech dominance between America and China is obvious evidence of 
this. During this movement for hegemony between countries, Chinese 
companies, especially its’ multinational enterprises (CMNEs) 
advancement into the global market became difficult, in addition, they met 
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many risks. 
This paper will focus on the “ZTE Event” and the “Huawei Event” to 
examine the “trade war” and the battle for high-tech dominance, uncover 
the features and the essences between the U.S. and China. Meanwhile, this 
paper will also propose to look at how the Japanese government and 
Japanese companies are dealing with the trade war and the battle for 
hegemony between the two super powers. The research method of this 
study is an earlier literature review and the examination of press releases. 
The primary source of this paper is mostly the annual reports of the case 
companies, and part of the data and documents were from press releases. 
This paper will explicit that the competition between companies is also the 
competition between countries. It will also point out the obstacles for 
emerging countries’ multinational enterprise (EMNEs) to advance into the 
global market. Some implications from this research will also be looked into. 
 
2. The trade war between America and China 
In early 2018, the American government announced that it would 
activate safeguards by adding extra tariffs of 30% to solar panels and 20% 
to washing machines. On March 1st, based on Clause 232 in the Trade 
Expansion Act, the U.S. announced their intention to add extra tariffs to 
steel and aluminum products. The tariffs started on March 23rd. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government also began to retaliate against the 
actions of the U.S. China announced it would add about $3 billion of tariffs 
to 128 American products. On April 1st, China announced that it would 
add retaliatory customs of 15% - 25% against imported fruits and other 
products from America. These actions by the U.S. and the Chinese 
government started the trade war between the two world super powers. 
On July 6th 2018, the American government announced that it would 
add $34 billion of tariffs to 818 imported Chinese products. The Chinese 
retaliated with the same sum of customs on American products. The trade 
war between the two nations became more serious. Until now, the trade 
war between the U.S. and China has had 4 rounds. (See Figure 1) 
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Figure 1.  4 Rounds of Trade War between America and China 
Rounds Data 
% of Tariff 
Added 
Amount of Tariffs added 
America to 
China ($) 
China to 
America ($) 
First 7/6, 2018 25% 34 billion 34 billion 
Second 8/23, 2018 25% 16 billion 16 billion 
Third 
since 5/10, 
2019 (the U.S.); 
since 6/6, 2019 
(China) 
10% to 25% 200 billion 60 billion 
Fourth 9/1, 2019 
+15% (the 
U.S.)  +5-
+35% (China)  
300 billion 75 billion 
Source: The Asahi Shimbun (in Japanese), September 2nd 2019. 
 
On December 13th 2019, the Chinese government at a selected media 
outlet in Beijing held a briefing. Vice Commerce Minister Wang Shouwen 
said at the briefing that China and the U.S. agreed on the text of a phase 
one trade deal that included the removal of tariffs on Chinese goods in 
stages. The U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed that some levies will 
be reduced and said the next round of talks will start immediately. At the 
same time, China would increase imports from the U.S. and other countries. 
Chinese Vice Chairman of the National Reform and Development 
Commission, Ning Jizhe, added that the specifics of agricultural purchases 
would be released later, as the text of the agreement is still under review.2) 
The comments were China’s first response to a deal signed off by 
Trump in the day before, that would halt the higher tariffs planned for Dec. 
15 and represent the first phase in defusing the trade war that has shaken 
the global economy. Trump tweeted, “we have agreed to a very large Phase 
One Deal with China. They have agreed to make many structural changes 
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and massive purchases of agricultural products, energy, and manufactured 
goods, plus much more. The 25% tariffs will remain as is, with 7.5% put on 
much of the remainder...”3) 
    Both the U.S. and China agreed to finish the final stages such as legal 
review and translation as soon as possible and work on arrangements for 
the final signing. The text of the phase one trade deal has been completed, 
and the higher tariffs planned for Dec. 15 were postponed. Thus, the trade 
war that shock the world economy is over for now. 
 
3. Battle for high-tech dominance: focusing on the “ZTE Event” 
and the “Huawei Event” 
 
3.1 ZTE and the “ZTE Event” 
 
3.1.1 The History and Outline of ZTE4) 
ZTE was founded in Shen Zhen in 1985 and started as a state 
controlled firm. Later it was restructured, and ZTE then became a “mixed 
possession company” 5). In 1997, ZTE listed in the A Stock Section on the 
Shen Zhen Stock Exchange, and 7 years later in 2004, ZTE listed in the H 
Stock Section on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. As of the end of 2016, 
81.95% of the shares were A stock and 18.05% of the shares were H stock 
among ZTE’s equities capital. In 2016, there were 81,468 employees 
working for ZTE and their average age was 32, and 36.93% of employees 
worked in R&D. There are a total of 20 R&D centers, 13 located in China 
and 7 distributed in other countries such as America, France, Sweden, 
Japan, Canada and so forth. Up to September 31st 2016, ZTE submitted 
more than 68,000 applications for patents to PCT, and 28,000 have been 
permitted to be used. 6) From 2012, ZTE continued to be in the top 3 
positions for the number of patent applications to PCT. The sales of ZTE 
grew from 23.2 bn. RMB (about $3.7 bn.) in 2006 to 101.2 bn. RMB (about 
$16.3 bn.) in 2016. (See Figure 2) 
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Figure 2. The Operating Profits of ZTE from 2006 to 2016 (100M, RMB ) 
 
Source: ZTE’s Annual Report from 2012 to 2016 
 
However, in 2017 the United States Department of Commerce (USDC) 
punished ZTE for illegally trading with Iran. This considerably decreased 
ZTE’s operating profits. In 2018, the U.S. government fined ZTE again for 
not following through on their promises to the American government. All 
of these measures had a severe impact on ZTE, and this matter created a 
significant risk for ZTE’s future advancement into the American market. 
This risk can be labeled as “pitfalls” which impeded CMNEs overseas 
expansion. 
 
3.1.2 The Outline of the “ZTE Event” 
In March 2017, the USDC found ZTE guilty of illegally shipping items 
of American origin to Iran from 2010 to 2016 in violation of U.S. sanctions. 
ZTE was punished and agreed to $1.19 billion in penalties and a suspended 
denial of export privileges. This was followed up by the U.S suddenly 
banning American firms from selling parts and software to ZTE for 7 years 
on April 16th 2018.7) 
This move in April 2018 by the U.S. government to punish ZTE came 
at a time when the world’s two largest economies threatened each other 
with tens of billions of dollars in tariffs. The Chinese government 
responded swiftly, warning it was prepared to take action to protect the 
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interests of Chinese firms and pronounced that it hoped that the U. S. could 
deal with the issue in accordance with the law. 
On April 20th 2018 in Shenzhen, Yin Yi Min, the former chairman of 
ZTE, explained the company's position to selected media outlets and 
stressed that “we have the ability and the will to tide over this crisis. We 
are definitely not going to give up”.8) 
Nevertheless, U.S. actions could be catastrophic for ZTE since 
American companies are estimated to provide 25% - 30% of the components 
used in ZTE’s equipment. This includes smartphones and mobile operating 
systems to build telecommunication networks. If this situation could not be 
solved smoothly and immediately, ZTE would face a tremendous disaster 
and would be forced to scale back its smartphone business, not only in the 
U. S., but also in other markets.9) 
After the ban was announced, trading in ZTE shares on the Hong Kong 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was immediately suspended on April 
17th 2018. Asset managers started to discount the value of ZTE shares that 
they held in their funds. Both the ZTE value of their Shenzhen-listed stock 
and their Hong Kong-listed stock decreased by 36% in just one day. That 
translated to roughly a $7 billion loss in the combined market 
capitalization.10) 
As a result, ZTE began to discharge their employees, even their 
engineers. On August 2018, the ZTE R&D center located in NanJing 
announced that 100 employees would be laid off.11) Meanwhile, an 
undisclosed number of specialists left ZTE. ZTE then entered into a term 
of uncertainty. 
Not only ZTE, but also other Chinese companies in the American 
market became the scapegoats of the trade war and the battle for high-tech 
dominance between the U.S. and the Chinese government. The “Huawei 
Event” is another example of this battle. Next, let’s look at the “Huawei 
Event”. 
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3.2  Huawei and the “Huawei Event” 
 
3.2.1 The History and Outline of Huawei12) 
In 1987, Huawei was established in Shenzhen, the first Special 
Economic Zone in China. At the beginning, Huawei was just a distributor 
of products for a Hong Kong firm, which manufactured the private branch 
exchange (PBX) for the call extensions in companies and the ISDN lines for 
public connection. After its technology developed, Huawei began to 
manufacture and sell its original PBX to hotels and small to mid-sized 
companies. Thereafter, Huawei started to manufacture the automatic 
switchboard and made great strides in the rural market. 
The first switchboard that Huawei developed was JK1000 at the end 
of 1980s, which was half digital & half machinery. After 6 months, Huawei 
started to develop the automatic switchboard and successfully developed 
the automatic switchboard named C&C08, which contained 2000 lines. 
Following this success, Huawei developed a switchboard which had 10,000 
lines. However, in urban areas in China, the market of switchboards in 
telephone stations was still under the control of Shanghai Bell (Belgium) 
& Alcatel (France) in the 1990s. 
The strategy of Huawei’s overseas expansion is the replica of its 
domestic marketing strategy, known as “from rural to city”, and was also 
named “reversed direction strategy” 13). This strategy was a huge success. 
Today, Huawei has been providing its products and services not only to 
clients such as China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, etc. which are 
all major communication carriers in China, but also to clients like British 
Telecom, AIS, Telefonica, Singapore Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, 
TeliaSonera, etc. which are all major communication carriers abroad. 
Huawei became the top enterprise in the ICT equipment industry in the 
world since 2013. (See Figure 3 and Figure 4) 
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Figure 3. The Growth of Sales in Huawei (2005-2016)(100m, dollar) 
 
Source: Huawei’s Annual Report 2005 through 2016 
 
Figure 4. The Sales of Top 4 ICT Companies in the World (2012-2016) 
(100M, ＄) 
 
Source: The Annual Reports of Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia and ZTE 
 
3.2.2 The Outline of the “Huawei Event” 
On April 25th 2018, the U.S. Justice Department probed Huawei on 
allegations of violating trade sanctions against Iran. Huawei said in a 
statement the following day that it had been complying with "all applicable 
laws and regulations where it operates." On December 1st 2018, Canadian 
Judicial Police arrested Meng Wan Zhou, the deputy chairperson of the 
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board and the CFO of Huawei. This arrest was carried out at the request 
of the United States. The U.S. alleged that Huawei defrauded multiple 
financial institutions in breach of the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran. On 
January 28th 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice announced financial 
fraud charges against Meng Wan Zhou. 
On May 15th 2019, The U.S. president, Donald Trump signed an order 
that would restrict Huawei and fellow Chinese telecommunications 
company ZTE Corp. from selling their equipment in the U.S. Shortly 
afterward, the Department of Commerce said it had put Huawei on a 
blacklist that would forbid it from doing business with American 
companies.14) After a meeting between the Chairman of China, Xi Jin Ping 
and the President of the U.S., D. Trump in the Osaka Summit on June 29th 
2019, the ban was postponed at that moment. 
 
3.3 The Impacts of the “ZTE Event” and the “Huawei Event” 
The “ZTE Event” and the “Huawei Event” had a severe impact on the 
world economy and industries. It is not only the battle for the high-tech 
domination between China and America, but also embroiled many other 
countries. On November 22nd 2018, the American government asked 
Japan and their other Allies to refuse Huawei products15). The New 
Zealand and Japanese governments followed the request, and asked their 
domestic companies to refuse Huawei products from November 28th and 
December 7th 2018, respectively. Australia and the UK have also 
restrained their domestic companies from using Huawei products even 
before the American government made their request16). 
On May 22nd 2019, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in 
USDC put many Chinese high-tech firms, for example Hikvision, Dahua 
Technology and so forth, onto the Entity List to block them from using US 
products and technology.17) This action from the American government 
further heated up the trade war and the techno-hegemony battle between 
China and America. 
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4 How did Japan deal with the battle between the two 
superpowers? 
 
4.1 The impacts from the battle between the world’s two superpowers 
in Japan 
Many world organizations like the WTO, IMF and other financial 
companies such as Barclays Capital, the Bank of England, and so forth, 
predicted a downward trend of the world economy due to the impacts of the 
trade war.  
The IMF expected that an increase in tariffs would slow down global 
growth by about 0.5 percent. The battle between the two world 
superpowers would also decrease Japan’s GDP by about 0.6 percent, and 
slow down Japan’s potential economic growth rate by approximately 0.5 - 
1 percent.18) 
The trade war between America and China also had a negative impact 
on Japanese industries. The Japanese automobile industry was severely 
affected compared to other industries, because the biggest manufacturing 
base of Japanese automobile companies is located in China, and their 
largest export destination is America. If this continues, the competitive 
advantage of Japanese industries would weaken, and the Japanese 
economy would be severely harmed in the near future. 
 
4.2 The response from the Japanese government 
Japan, as a protected nation under the U.S. mainly follows the 
intentions of the American government. When the trade war became more 
intense, the American government asked Japan and their other allies to 
refuse Huawei’s products, the Japanese government followed this request, 
and asked Japanese companies to comply. Japanese major communication 
carriers such as SoftBank and so forth have conformed with the request, 
and changed their supply clients from Huawei and ZTE to Ericsson and 
Nokia.19) 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government demonstrated strong crisis 
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awareness regarding the battle between America and China. Japan 
observed that the digital revolution had deeply penetrated society. The 
innovative digital products and service systems from American companies 
and Chinese companies have rapidly developed, and they have been 
continually occupying the new market. It could be said that Japan did not 
use its resources of “technology”, “talent” and “capital” effectively and 
strategically for new business creation. If Japan does not act immediately, 
it will be embedded by the trend of this global competition. 
The Japanese government is seriously concerned about this trend. 
Thus, as a state growth strategy, “The future investment strategy 2018” 
was revealed in 2018 by the Japanese government. The state growth 
strategy is described as to build “Society 5.0”. In “Society 5.0”, life will be 
much more convenient. For example, deliveries by drones, robots and 
autonomous cars, the advancement of AI, an IoT strategy and analytics as 
well as others. Furthermore, diverse energy and environment friendly, best 
value chain and automatic production, automatic farm work and optimal 
delivery, preventive screening and robot caregivers, etc. will be envisioned 
in the future.20) In order to build “Society 5.0” and sustain a competitive 
advantage over their rivals, the Japanese government has taken 
immediate action to create technology policies, develop new laws, and so 
forth. 
 
4.3 The actions of Japanese companies during the trade war between 
America and China 
    The trade war and the battle for high-tech dominance between 
America and China also forced Japanese companies to reconsider and 
revise their overseas strategies, and many Japanese companies which have 
branches or plants in China began to transfer them out of China21). Uniqlo, 
the largest casual clothing retailer in Japan, began to rebuild its overseas 
strategy as most of its merchandise is made in China. Ricoh, the largest 
multifunction printer (MFD) manufacturer in Japan, transferred its plant 
from China to Thailand in 2018. Kyocera, the largest ceramic products 
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company in Japan, announced that it will transfer its MFD and copying 
machine products from China to Vietnam. Nintendo, the largest gaming 
software company in Japan, transferred part of its household game 
machine production of “Nintendo Switch” from China to Vietnam. Sony, the 
famous Japanese consumer electrical appliance company, has begun to 
consider how to transfer its game machine production of “PlayStation®4” 
out of China, too. Other well-known Japanese companies such as Casio, 
Komatsu, Asics and so forth, have transferred or are preparing to transfer 
their overseas production bases out of China22). 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper examined the “Trade war” and the battle for high-tech 
dominance between America and China mostly through the “ZTE Event” 
and “Huawei Event”. It pointed out the background of the trade war and 
the battle for high-tech dominance between the two world superpowers. In 
addition, it indicated the impacts of the trade war and the battle for high-
tech dominance. It also introduced the approaches of the Japanese 
government and Japanese companies during the battle between the two 
world superpowers. 
Meanwhile, this paper exposed a “new type” of competition, describing 
the competition between companies as equally being the competition 
between countries. The experiences and problems that ZTE and Huawei 
have faced in their overseas expansion may help to provide some 
suggestions to other companies in developing countries when they expand 
into future global markets, because their starting conditions will be similar 
to those of ZTE and Huawei. 
At the same time, proceed to strengthen risk management when 
expanding overseas will be a big remaining issue for the emerging 
countries MNEs (EMNEs). ZTE and Huawei have focused on targeting the 
developed markets after almost 20 years of overseas expansion, and they 
have also become global ICT firms. However, the EMNEs have also created 
intensive competition with the developed countries MNEs (DMNEs). The 
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battle for techno-hegemony between the world’s two biggest economies was 
the clear evidence of the above. Furthermore, this competition between 
companies has involved governments, making matters even more 
complicated as in the ZTE and Huawei cases. Strengthening the methods 
of risk management for EMNEs is a critical issue to focus on in the future. 
 
 
Notes 
1. “Made in China 2025” is a strategic plan of China issued by the Chinese 
Premier in May 2015. With it, China aims to move away from being the 
world’s “factory”, and move to producing higher value products and 
services. It is in essence a blueprint to upgrade the manufacturing 
capabilities of Chinese industries. 
2. China, U.S. Agree on Initial Trade Deal to Remove Some Tariffs 
Bloomberg News, 14th December 2019. 
3. Idem. 
4. Yong Ge LIU (2014) The Internationalization Strategy of Chinese 
Multinational Firms: Focusing on the ZTE Co. Ltd. Case (in Japanese), 
Journal of Business Administration No.83, pp.63-78. 
5. “Mixed possession company” means a company owned by many different 
owners, such as the state, a municipality, a fund, or individuals etc. As of the 
end of 2016, 30.35% of ZTE’s share were owned by the Chinese government, 
other shareholders of ZTE were banks, funds, municipalities and individuals. 
6. ZTE Annual Report 2017. 
7. Reuter News, April 17th 2018. (https://jp.reuters.com/article/usa-china-zte-
commerce- idJPKBN1HN2H7) 
8. C114 Communication Network, April 20th 2018. 
9. NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW, April 27th 2018. 
10. IT Scoops: Even though ZTE lost 70 billion RMB of their market value, ZTE still 
want to increase the independent directors’ pay by 120,000 RMB per person. 
 (https://xueqiu.com/9136448150/109704944) 
11. Financial Journal News in SOUHU, It is said that ZTE began a new round to 
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fire its employees (in Chinese). (https://m.sohu.com/a/251649736_323087?_f) 
12. Yong Ge LIU (2015) Internationalization Strategy of Chinese ICT 
Multinational Firms: Huawei and ZTE Co. Ltd. Cases (in Japanese) 
Journal of Business Administration No.85, pp.159-176. 
13. Yong Ge LIU (2017) The Reverse Direction Strategy of Overseas Expansion 
with Chinese ICT Equipment Firms: The Cases of Huawei and ZTE co. Ltd. 
Journal of Business Administration No.90, pp.1-14. 
14. Margaret Talev, Todd Shields, and Shawn Donnan Trump Moves to Curb 
Huawei as Trade War With China Escalates, Bloomberg, May 16th 2019. 
15. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Washington Asks Allies to Drop Huawei. 
(https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-huawei-
1542965105) 
16. FINANCIAL TIMES UK warns telecoms groups to check security of 5G 
suppliers. (https://www.ft.com/content/29eb5d28-e10d-11e8-8e70-5e22a430c1ad) 
  Huawei & ZTE have been banned from providing 5G technology to 
Australia (in Japanese). (https://japanese.engadget.com/2018/08/27/zte-5g/) 
17. Bloomberg U.S. Weighs Blacklist of Up to Five Chinese Surveillance Firms 
 (http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/articales/2019-5-23/) 
18. Takahide Kiuchi (2019) The effects of the trade war between America and 
China on Japanese economy, JFTC MONTHLY ONLINE. 
  (https://www.jftc.jp>monthly>feature>detail>entry-1482) 
19. SoftBank began to exclude Huawei products in its existing base station 
(in Japanese) 
(https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO38878170T11C18A2MM8000/) 
20. CAO Public Relations Office (2018) Society 5.0 
 (https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/society5_0/index.html) 
21. THE SANKEI NEWS During the trade war, America added the tariffs to 
the imported Chinese items, Japanese companies withdraw from China 
increasingly. 
(https://www.sankei.com/economy/news/190901/ecn1909010007-n1.html 
22. Yuki Furukawa, Pavel Alpeyev and Kantaro Komiya Japanese Companies 
Escaped from China, the Trade War Conflicts between the U.S. and China 
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got serious, and Nintendo Transferred to Vietnam.  
(https://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/articles/2019-08-05/PVR37W6JTSE801) 
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